proceedings lie outside the realm of the First Amendment; thus, the Noerr-Pennington doctrine should not apply.
Second, in the administrative realm, this Comment distinguishes between political and adjudicatory agency functions based on the Administrative Procedure Act ("APA")" to determine when immunity should apply. This test revolves around the fact-specific nature of the agency inquiry. Noerr-Pennington immunity should not apply when the agency proceeding involves significant factual inquiries (such as in a permit application process, where applicants must apply significant and specific factual information). Noerr-Pennington immunity should apply where the agency proceedings are designed to make broader policy determinations that do not rely as much on specific factual information. This fact-specific standard protects against fraud and misrepresentation (which lies outside the First Amendment'), protects agencies from receiving deliberately false information from companies (which lies inside the purposes of antitrust laws 3 ), and allows the judiciary to act in its proper role as a check on the executive. 4 Part I of this Comment analyzes the origins of the NoerrPennington doctrine and subsequent cases concerning fraud and misrepresentation. Part L.A specifically examines the "sham" exception to Noerr-Pennington immunity. This Part also searches for Court guidance in fraud and misrepresentation cases. Part I.B discusses the statutory framework for different administrative proceedings under the APA. Part II examines lower court dissension concerning whether a fraud exception to Noerr-Pennington immunity exists. Part III argues that a fraud and misrepresentation exception should apply in judicial proceedings based on recognized First Amendment limitations. This Part examines First Amendment jurisprudence, particularly libel law, to determine the outer boundaries of the right to petition. It then considers how fraud and misrepresentation fit into that jurisprudence. Part IV presents the solution involving administrative agency proceedings. Using the administrative proceedings framework in Part I.B, this Comment presents a fact-specific standard to determine when a business's involvement in an agency proceeding should subject that entity to antitrust liability.
I. SUPREME COURT JURISPRUDENCE UNDER THE

NOERR-PENNINGTON DOCTRINE
The antitrust laws give government broad power to prohibit "combinations or conspiracies in restraint of trade or commerce, the monopolization of trade or commerce or attempts to monopolize the same."" This power is intended to protect free competition by forcing companies to allocate their resources to create the highest quality products at the lowest possible prices. '6 The reach of the antitrust laws, however, has some limits.
The Noerr-Pennington doctrine presents one limit on antitrust law-it protects companies' lobbying efforts. To this extent, the NoerrPennington doctrine reflects First Amendment guarantees of free speech and freedom to petition the government. This Part discusses the key cases that created and interpreted the Noerr-Pennington doctrine.
A. The Noerr-Pennington Doctrine 1. The early cases.
In Noerr, a group of Pennsylvania truckers alleged that several railroads and the Eastern Railroad Presidents Conference engaged in a conspiracy in violation of the Sherman Act." Specifically, the truckers alleged that the railroads launched a negative publicity campaign against truckers; the aim of which was to damage the trucking business, including existing relationships between truckers and their customers.' 8 The defendants counterclaimed by stating much the same of the truckers.' 9 The district court found against the railroad company because its campaign was "malicious and fraudulent." ' [The antitrust laws] rest[ on the premise that the unrestrained interaction of competitive forces will yield the best allocation of our economic resources, the lowest prices, the highest quality and the greatest material progress, while at the same time providing an environment conducive to the preservation of our democratic political and social institutions. 17 Noerr, 365 US at 129. 18 Id. The Court found that the aim of the campaign was "to foster the adoption of laws and law enforcement practices destructive of the trucking business, to create an atmosphere of distaste for the truckers among the general public, and to impair the relationship between the truckers and their customers." Id.
19 Id at 132 (stating that the defendants claimed the truckers had conspired to "destroy the railroads' competition in the long-distance freight business and to monopolize that business for heavy trucks"). 20 Id at 133. The Supreme Court explained: "The District Court did not expressly find that any particular part of the railroads' publicity campaign was false in its content. Rather, it found that the technique of the railroads was 'to take a dramatic fragment of truth and by emphasis and admitted to conducting a campaign to influence the passage of state laws relating to truck weight limits and tax rates on heavy trucks, but they maintained they had no desire to destroy the trucking business as a competitor nor to interfere with trucker-customer relationships.'
The Supreme Court found for the railroad on two separate grounds. First, the Sherman Act neither regulated political activity nor infringed on the concept of representation.= Second, holding against the railroads "would raise important constitutional questions" about the right to petition the government.0 The Court recognized that groups with a significant interest in the outcome of certain legislation often provide important information to Congress about the issues in question. 2 ' The unethical tactics used in the publicity campaign were of no moment to the Court. Pennington upheld the same immunity doctrine where coal companies and unions successfully persuaded the Secretary of Labor to establish minimum wages for employees of contractors, thereby frustrating the non-unionized companies' attempts to compete in the coal market. To hold that the government retains the power to act in this representative capacity and yet hold, at the same time, that the people cannot freely inform the government of their wishes would impute to the Sherman Act a purpose to regulate, not business activity, but political activity, a purpose which would have no basis whatever in the legislative history of that Act. 23 Id at 138. See US Const Amend I ("Congress shall make no law ... abridging ... the right of the people ... to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.").
24 Noerr, 365 US at 139. 25 Id at 145 (holding that "deception [of public officials], reprehensible as it is, can be of no consequence so far as the Sherman Act is concerned").
26 Pennington, 381 US at 660,670. 27 404 US 508 (1972) .
28 Id at 509.
29
Id at 510 ("The [Noerr-Pennington doctrine] governs the approach of citizens or groups of them to administrative agencies (which are both creatures of the legislature, and arms of the executive) and to courts, the third branch of Government. Certainly the right to petition extends to all departments of the Government'). See also Part I.B. success on the merits."", If the lawsuit is "reasonably calculated to elicit a favorable outcome," Noerr-Pennington immunity applies. 39 Second, if the litigation is objectively baseless, then liability depends on the subjective intent of the party. If the litigation "conceals an attempt to interfere directly with the business relationships of a competitor through the use of the governmental process-as opposed to the outcome of that process," Noerr-Pennington immunity fails.4 Even without the immunity, however, the plaintiff must still show an antitrust claim.
The Court did not explain how fraud or misrepresentation would play into a determination of either of the two steps of the sham litigation test. The Professional Real Estate Court did not elaborate on how fraud affected a determination that a suit was "objectively baseless" or the subjective intent of the party. Unlike California Motor, which implied that fraud could create antitrust liability, ' The APA separates administrative proceedings into two worlds depending on whether they result in "rules" or "orders." 7 Rules have a future effect and are "designed to implement, interpret, or prescribe law or policy.", On the other hand, orders, like judicial decisions, constitute "final disposition[s]" of current controversies. ' 9 Rulemaking proceedings lead to rules, and adjudicatory proceedings lead to orders. 0 Rulemaking and adjudicatory processes follow different procedures. The rulemaking process requires that the administrator give public notice of the proceeding, provide an opportunity for interested parties to comment on the subject of a rulemaking, and include in the final rule a brief statement of the reason for its adoption. The adjudicatory process, in contrast, tends to follow a more formalized procedure and resembles a judicial proceeding. Parties to adjudication receive notice of the proceeding and participate more extensively in producing and contesting the information on which the decision is based than do parties in rulemaking. 2 The APA's language lends support to the view that adjudications should resemble trials. For example, in adjudications, " [a] party is entitled to present his case or defense by oral or documentary evidence, to submit rebuttal evidence, and to conduct such cross-examination as may be required for a full and true disclosure of the facts." 53 The adjudication provisions also address burdens of proof and rules of evidence," allude to discovery procedures, 55 regulate the form of the decision," require a transcript of the making is ... essentially legislative in nature, not only because it operates in the future but also because it is primarily concerned with policy considerations. The object of the rule making proceeding is the implementation or prescription of law or policy for the future, rather than the evaluation of respondent's past conduct .... Conversely, adjudication is concerned with the determination of past and present rights and responsibilities. 46 See Part IV. 47 5 USC § 551 (1994) . 48 Id § 551(4). 49 Id § 551(6).
50
See id § 551(4)-(7). 51 Id § 553 (1994). 52 Id § 554,556,557 (1994). 53 
Id § 556(d).
54 See id.
55
See id § 556(c). 56 See id § 557.
[69:325 proceedings,57 and mandate that the decision be based on the record and "supported by ... reliable, probative, and substantial evidence." ' The break between adjudications and rulemaking procedures is not perfectly clean. The APA permits a more informal rulemaking procedure as well as a more informal adjudication procedure. In some rulemaking proceedings, for example, the APA allows interested parties to participate in rulemaking by submitting written evidence or arguments and by requiring agencies to articulate the basis of their decision. " Exceptions also exist to the requirement of a trial-type hearing in adjudicatory proceedings.o Almost every section of the APA contains exceptions such that the formal rigors of adjudication or rulemaking do not apply to certain types of decisions. The adjudication provision, for example, makes exceptions for certain personnel decisions, determinations based on inspections or tests, and matters pertaining to military and foreign af-61 fairs. The rulemaking section contains a general exception for some matters and specific exceptions to its notice, hearing, and publication requirements.u Since the APA acts only as a default set of rules for agency proceedings, some federal statutes mandate that certain agencies use hybrid processes that combine legislative and adjudicatory procedures.0 In addition, the APA does not mandate that an agency must take a particular avenue in its policy formulation. Administrative proceedings, therefore, can exhibit characteristics of both legislative and judicial actions.
The Court's varying treatment of administrative agencies in Noerr-Pennington cases reflects this legislative-judicial distinction. In California Motor, the Court allowed Noerr-Pennington immunity to extend to administrative agencies.6 The decision protected the rights of association and petition.6 The reach of the Noerr-Pennington doc- 57 Id § 556(e). 64 404 US at 510 (identifying administrative agencies as "both creatures of the legislature, and arms of the executive"). 65 Id at 510-11 ("We conclude that it would be destructive of rights of association and of petition to hold that groups with common interests may not, without violating the antitrust laws, use the channels and procedures of state and federal agencies and courts to advocate their causes and points of view.").
trine in administrative proceedings, however, is unknown. The Court attempted to distinguish between "political activities" and "conduct in the setting of the adjudicatory process."' Quoting Noerr, the Court emphasized the extreme caution necessary in imputing to legislation the ability to curtail First Amendment rights. 67 The Court noted that in an adjudicatory process, however, "unethical conduct ... often results in sanctions .... There are many other forms of illegal and reprehensible practice which may corrupt the administrative or judicial processes and which may result in antitrust violations." ' The Court qualified this language, stating that both parties have the right of access to agencies "within the limits ... of their prescribed procedures.'' Indeed, the cases recognize that antitrust liability can occur if a fact-finder has concluded that the administrative and judicial processes have been abused. 0 The Court has not elaborated further on this distinction. 7' Because of the Court's lack of clarity, lower courts have not achieved consensus in interpreting these precedents.
II. COMPETING INTERPRETATIONS OF FRAUD AND MISREPRESENTATION IN NOERR-PENNINGTON JURISPRUDENCE
In the years following Professional Real Estate, courts have taken opposing approaches to fraud and misrepresentation in antitrust proceedings. Some courts ignore the misrepresentations and apply NoerrPennington immunity. Others have treated fraud and misrepresentation as independent grounds for denying Noerr-Pennington immunity.
A. The Third Circuit Ignores Fraud in Armstrong
One view of fraud advanced by courts is that agencies have significant protections against fraud, so a fraud exception is unnecessary. The Third Circuit addressed misrepresentation in the administrative setting in Armstrong Surgical Center, Inc v Armstrong County Memorial Hospital.7 Pursuant to statute, the plaintiff, in order to construct a new outpatient center, had to obtain a Certificate of Need ("CON") 66 Idat512.
67
Id, quoting Noerr, 365 US at 141 ("Congress has traditionally exercised extreme caution in legislating with respect to problems relating to the conduct of political activities.").
68 California Motor, 44 US at 512-13.
69
Id at 515. from the Pennsylvania Department of Health.7 The CON process includes "an extensive proceeding consisting of an investigation, an evaluation of submitted materials, and a public hearing" to determine whether a new center would be needed and to ensure the new facility would not cause a needless duplication of services. The plaintiff alleged that the defendant hospital made misrepresentations in the CON process that resulted in the denial of their certificate." Specifically, the plaintiff alleged that the hospital misled the Department when the hospital claimed that it would open its own outpatient center when, in fact, it had halted construction on the facility and did not plan to resume. 76 The plaintiff also alleged that the hospital's physicians claimed falsely to the Department that they would not use the plaintiff's proposed outpatient center."
The court held that Noerr-Pennington immunity protected the hospital from antitrust liability. 5 The court began with the proposition that antitrust laws regulate business, not politics. The court disregarded the sham petition exception because the plaintiff never alleged that the petitioning conduct was for any purpose other than obtaining favorable government action, and the sham exception applied solely to the use of the governmental process itself to engage in anticompetitive conduct.' Therefore, because the injury came from the denial of the CON, not the process of obtaining the CON, no liability resulted. 8' In turning to the misrepresentation question, the Third Circuit began by pointing out that Professional Real Estate left the issue open.n2 In part relying on the supposition that "deception, reprehensible as it is, can be of no consequence so far as the Sherman Act is con- cerned," the court avoided looking into the particulars of the agency decision. ' The statute authorized the Department of Health to regulate the number, size, and spacing of health care facilities. ' The Department was "disinterested, conducted their own investigation, and afforded all interested parties an opportunity to set the record straight." ' 6 It issued findings to support its conclusion that the proposed center was not in the public interest. 7 Although the ruling did not include a specific finding on the misrepresentation, the Department heard evidence on it and made a credibility determination.' Any party who thought a fraud had been committed could have moved to reopen the proceedings to determine if the Department was misled.9 Armstrong thus stands for two propositions: 1) that the agency has enough valid checks to prevent fraud and misrepresentations from tainting a decision, and 2) that courts should not inquire into the validity of agency decisions under the auspices of the antitrust laws. Fraud and misrepresentation, therefore, do not nullify the Noerr-Pennington doctrine, according to the Third Circuit.
B. Fraud and Misrepresentation as Independent Grounds for
Eliminating Kottle, like Armstrong, involved a CON application." Also, as in Armstrong, the process for receiving a CON involved an extensive statutorily mandated process.9 Northwest blocked Kottle's CON application and Kottle sued, claiming Northwest made false statements and misrepresentations in the hearing. 4 The court identified three possible exceptions to Noerr-Pennington immunity. The first was the twopart sham litigation test of Professional Real Estate. % The second exception would be met if a series of lawsuits had been filed "pursuant to a policy of starting legal proceedings without regard to the merits and for the purpose of injuring a market rival." 4 Finally, sham litigation could be found if "a party's knowing fraud upon, or its intentional misrepresentations to, the court deprive the litigation of its legitimacy."'3
Recognizing that the current suit involved an administrative agency instead of a court, the analysis turned on "whether the executive entity in question more resembled a judicial body, or more resembled a political entity." 9 The court noted that, on both the federal and state levels, administrative decisions vary from highly structured procedural decisions by the agency to highly discretionary decisions by trade negotiators or advisers; therefore, a "totality of the circumstances" test should apply to the judicial versus political analysis. Finding that the CON procedure resembled an adjudicatory proceeding, the court applied the three tests for the sham exception. ' 1982) (discussing the threat that false information presents to the "fair and impartial functioning" of agency proceedings).
99 Kottle, 146 F3d at 1061. Whether an administrative agency resembles a judicial or legislative body is the core concern in determining whether antitrust liability applies. See Part IV. 100 Kottle, 146 F3d at 1062. 101 Id at 1062-63 (specifically (1) whether the advocacy was "objectively baseless," (2) whether there was a pattern of behavior, or (3) whether the misrepresentations deprived the process of legitimacy).
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The University of Chicago Law Review framework established that fraud or misrepresentation by itself could eliminate Noerr-Pennington immunity."
Other cases have given fraud and misrepresentation weight in determining Noerr-Pennington immunity. For example, in Whelan, the D.C. Circuit held that Noerr-Pennington immunity did not apply to deliberately false statements made to state securities officials. 04 Instead of using the two-part sham exception test in Professional Real Estate, the D.C. Circuit found the false statements deprived the defendant of Noerr-Pennington immunity. ' 
05
Several concepts have been advocated in trying to fill in the gap created in Professional Real Estate.'! 4 All have their weaknesses and strengths, but the myriad of conclusions begs for a more comprehensive standard in determining the place of fraud or misrepresentations allegations in response to Noerr-Pennington immunity.
III. A FRAMEWORK FOR EVALUATING FRAUD AND
MISREPRESENTATION CLAIMS IN THE JUDICIAL SETTING
The judicial context provides the easier case to advocate a fraud and misrepresentation exception to the Noerr-Pennington doctrine. Courts can already rely on significant precedent regarding the sham exception and fraud.
Noerr-Pennington immunity rests on two self-enforcing propositions: the right to petition the government and the right to engage in political activity.' 4 To the extent that fraud and misrepresentation take a party outside these two rights, courts can impose antitrust liability. In other words, if the First Amendment does not protect fraud or misrepresentation, then the Noerr-Pennington doctrine cannot protect them, either. This Part will examine the limits of these rights. ' 
A. The Limits of the Right to Petition
The right to petition extends to all branches of government."' Like other First Amendment protections, the right to petition is limited in scope. Although the First Amendment protects theoretical discussions and ideas, false statements of fact do not enjoy the same immunity: "neither the intentional lie nor the careless error materially advances society's interest in uninhibited, robust, and wide-open debate on public issues." 1 The Court has adopted this analysis in the realm of libel and defamation law, where the First Amendment right is balanced against the "individual's right to the protection of his own good name.. This right to protect one's reputation is based on a respect for "the essential dignity and worth of every [individual] ." ' 2 In McDonald v Smith, 3 the Court concluded that the right to petition did not rise to the level of an "unqualified right to express damaging falsehoods."" 4 Since the right to petition does not cover everything a party might say, the question then becomes what standard should determine what is covered. Petitions to any governmental body containing "intentional and reckless falsehoods do not enjoy constitutional protection."' The standard accords with the one announced in New York Times Co v Sullivan 11 as "actual malice": knowledge at the time the words were false, or with reckless disregard of whether they were false." 7 Evidence of this position abounds in the judicial rules and decisions. Legal judgments procured through fraud, misrepresentation, or other misconduct of an adverse party may be set aside." 8 Patents obtained by knowing and willful fraud are nullified because the patent_ process's purpose has been frustrated."' Perjury is an obvious example of testimony being nullified because of its misrepresentations."' this Comment. The Comment merely intends to pick up the relevant points of the doctrine as they relate to antitrust and administrative agencies.
109 California Motor, 404 US at 510.
B. Fraud and Misrepresentation in the Antitrust Realm
The analysis underlying fraud and misrepresentation goes handin-hand with the sham exception because both apply when the governmental process has been tainted through improper use. The sham exception applies where a party uses "the governmental process-as opposed to the outcome of that process-as an anticompetitive weapon." 121 Fraud and misrepresentation create a judicial outcome based on incorrect information that also may act as a bar to entry for other competitors. In both cases, a party has abused the judicial process to give itself an unfair advantage over a competitor.
A tort law analogy shows how fraud and misrepresentation disrupt the judicial process. The tort of abuse of process is available to a plaintiff who can show the presence of an ulterior motive and an overt act that is improper in the ordinary course of a proceeding.' This tort provides a remedy if legal procedure has been set in motion in proper form, with probable cause, and even with ultimate success, but has been perverted to accomplish an ulterior purpose.'2 A business, intending to keep its competitor out of the market by crippling it with litigation costs or an adverse judgment, could use misrepresentations to distort litigation and procure a favorable outcome 1 Thus, the existence of the tort of abuse of process shows that the right to petition or engage in political activity does not have an unlimited extension. Fraud and deliberate misrepresentations should therefore be acceptable grounds to eliminate Noerr-Pennington immunity in the judicial setting. Fraud and misrepresentation place an action outside the realm of the right to petition on which Noerr-Pennington is based.
The best standard for determining whether an action constitutes fraud or misrepresentation for purposes of the Noerr-Pennington doc-(holding that antitrust liability extended to a patentee who engaged in willful and knowing fraud on the PTO). This case seems to extend principles enumerated in Walker to include "inequitable conduct" as well as fraud. Id (noting that inequitable conduct "is a broader, more inclusive concept" than fraud).
120 California Motor, 404 US at 512 (discussing perjury as an example of conduct that results in litigation sanction). 124 In many situations, a plaintiff may bring an abuse-of-process tort suit as well. So why not just let plaintiffs bring an abuse of process tort action? First, it is not clear how well the tort claim and the fraud claim would map onto each other. There may be a large number of cases in which courts find that anticompetitive intent is an ulterior motive or that fraud or misrepresentation constitutes an overt act. Also, the antitrust claim has the unique feature of exposing the liable party to treble damages, which should act as a proper deterrent to parties who knowingly provide false information in judicial proceedings. See 15 USC § 15 (stating that plaintiffs in antitrust suits can recover treble damages and the cost of the suit, including attorney's fees). 129 Also, in order to prevent chilling of the right to petition, broad allegations of fraud and misrepresentation should not be allowed to survive summary judgment. In fact, the Federal Rules require particularity in fraud pleadings. FRCP 9(b). A lack of particularity indicates that plaintiffs are just tacking on fraud as a last point without trying to develop a specific fraud theory. A number of cases reject fraud claims for lack of particularity. See A fraud exception to the Noerr-Pennington doctrine makes sense. The First Amendment justification for Noerr-Pennington disappears when it protects fraud or misrepresentation. Since well-developed case law concerning fraud already exists, courts should be able to apply the exception to Noerr-Pennington with relative ease.
IV. APPLYING THE FRAUD EXCEPTION TO ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCY PROCEEDINGS USING THE FACT-SPECIFIC STANDARD
A different set of rules should govern whether the fraud exception applies in administrative actions. Recall that Congress purposefully included elements of judicial and legislative functions when creating the APA's rulemaking and adjudicatory processes." California Motor makes an explicit distinction between activity in the "political arena" and the "adjudicatory process." ' ' This distinction turns not on the right to petition the government, but on the premise that the antitrust laws do not regulate political activity."' Working from the assumption that the fraud exception exists in the judicial setting, the question for the administrative setting becomes whether the proceeding is judicial or legislative in nature. In California Motor, the Court equates legislative activity with rulemaking and judicial proceedings with the adjudicatory process. The Sherman Act considers company actions in the adjudicatory process as business activity.' 9 Hence, antitrust liability applies when companies commit fraud in the adjudica-2000) ("In addition, a plaintiff must independently show 'antitrust injury' in order to ensure that ,a plaintiff can recover only if the loss stems from a competition-reducing aspect or effect of the defendant's behavior."'), quoting Atlantic Richfield Co v USA Petroleum, 495 US 328, 334, 344 (1990) (internal quotation marks omitted).
134 McDonald, 472 US at 481 (stating that injuries suffered were not being appointed United States Attorney, an injured reputation and career as an attorney, and suffering humiliation, embarrassment, anxiety, and mental anguish).
135 See Part I.B. 136 See text accompanying notes 66-71. 137 See Noerr, 365 US at 136 ("We think it equally clear that the Sherman Act does not prohibit two or more persons from associating together in an attempt to persuade the legislature or the executive to take particular action with respect to a law that would produce a restraint or a monopoly.").
138 See text accompanying notes 66-71. 139 See California Motor, 404 US at 515 ("A combination of entrepreneurs to harass and deter their competitors from having 'free and unlimited access' to the agencies and courts, to defeat that right by massive, concerted, and purposeful activities of the group" violates the antitrust laws.). tory process, but they receive antitrust immunity when participating in the legislative process.
The fact-specific standard illuminates the dichotomy between political and adjudicatory proceedings. Judicial proceedings involve a fact-specific, particularized inquiry into a dispute between a relatively small number of parties. Thus, adjudicatory proceedings should exhibit the same characteristics." The specific procedures leading to an action's resolution should not matter as much as whether the character of the action itself is the defining of a broad policy or the settling of a factual dispute. Thus, this Comment argues that courts should determine whether an administrative agency proceeding is conducting a fact-specific particularized inquiry to determine if the NoerrPennington doctrine reaches that activity under the Sherman Act. This Part first discusses the elements of the fact-specific standard and then justifies its use.
A. The Fact-Specific Standard and Its Workability
In Part I.B, this Comment demonstrated that the line between rulemaking and adjudication is often blurry. The Supreme Court has also noted the difficulty of pigeonholing certain actions into the rulemaking or adjudicatory sphere. 41 In Londoner v Denver 4 ' and BiMetallic Investment Co v Colorado, " ' the Court distinguished between administrative and legislative proceedings in analyzing the right to be heard under the Due Process Clause.! Because a small number of people were involved with individualized circumstances, the Court treated the proceeding as judicial in nature and enforced the right to be heard. " ' On the other hand, "[w]here a rule of conduct applies to more than a few people it is impracticable that everyone should have a direct voice in its adoption." '46 ' The Court has noted that its decisions "represent a recognized distinction in administrative law between proceedings for the purpose of promulgating policy-type rules or standards, on the one hand, and proceedings designed to adjudicate . 144 Id at 445-46 (distinguishing decisions that affect "a relatively small number of persons"
with those that affect large populations, which, if everyone were allowed a right to be heard, would halt the government). 145 See Londoner, 210 US at 385.
146 Bi-Metallic, 239 US at 445.
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The University of Chicago Law Review disputed facts in particular cases on the other.' ' . 7 Thus, an appropriate standard for determining whether a proceeding is judicial or legislative is if the proceeding involves a fact-specific inquiry involving a limited number of parties. Like the malice standard noted in the judicial setting, the fact-specific standard brings with it significant case law for determining if a company's actions constitute business activity punishable under the Sherman Act. " ' Courts allow agencies to proceed through adjudication where a fact-specific inquiry takes place.'M Application procedures, such as licensing, provide an excellent example of a proceeding that meets the fact-specific standard. Armstrong, Kottle, and the example in this Comment's introduction fall in this category."o A significant portion of antitrust cases implicating administrative procedures involves licensing or application procedures instead of the notice and comment procedures usually used in a rulemaking action.' A licensing or application procedure can have a wide range of procedural formalities, but the heart of the dispute remains whether a company has met certain statutory requirements to merit a license or permit. The granting or rejecting of a license or application does not have far-reaching policy implications; rather, it only affects the parties involved in that factual determination.
Notice and comment proceedings, on the other hand, fall on the legislative side of the ledger because of their policy emphasis. " These proceedings rely more heavily on value judgments than facts. ' 3 Notice and comment proceedings also tend to have a wider range of effects than on any two given parties." Antitrust laws were not meant to extend to these broader policy actions." 5 Fraud claims also distinctly apply to situations where an administrative agency engages in a fact-specific inquiry. In policy-type proceedings, allegations are less subject to fraud or misrepresentation claims because they rely on broader social, political, or economic judgments. Fact-specific inquiries tend to be verifiable, discrete statements (for example, XYZ company made $30 million last year). Because of First Amendment concerns, courts should not worry about the former but should be concerned about the latter, particularly if a factual assertion specifically hurts an individual claimant. Thus, the fact-specific standard places those fraud claims that uniquely apply to business activity (rather than political activity) within the reach of the Sherman Act.
B. Justifications for the Fact-Specific Standard
Two main justifications underlie the need for the fact-specific standard to determine whether the Sherman Act should apply to business actions before administrative agencies. First, this standard prevents companies from engaging in unfair competition through agency capture. Second, the fact-specific standard allows courts to act as a check on agency action.
1. Agency capture.
The Sherman Act promotes competition, prevents monopolization, and creates efficiency and equality of opportunity for companies.LM A party winning an administrative claim based on fraudulent evidence wields the agency as a weapon to prevent a legitimate business from gaining a toehold in the market. Fraudulent submissions to such a body probably mean that the party intends to use the administrative process to delay its competitor by increasing entry costs. This scenario invokes what commentators term the "agency capture" the- [69:325 products and increase transaction costs for competitors.'Q Administrative proceedings, much more so than judicial proceedings, tend to rely on the information that the parties provide to them. ' 6 These agencies lack the necessary funds to verify the accuracy of every allegation." Because of these concerns, some administrative agencies have gone so far as to ask the courts to impose antitrust liability against those who abuse the process to help deter future action.'6
Thus, in those circumstances in which agencies lack the resources to verify facts in applications, permits, and licenses, the judiciary provides an excellent backstop to prevent fraudulent applications by companies. Egregious examples of fraud that hurt competition will lead to lawsuits brought by companies harmed by an improper ruling.' Because of the heightened pleading requirements, courts can quickly find the claims that might have merit and avoid prolonged litigation. Obviously, this system will not catch all instances of fraud and misrepresentation. Some meritorious claims may slip through because a plaintiff does not have information to plead with particularity. With broad civil discovery rules and the threat of treble damage liability, however, these rules should promote more truthful submissions by companies in agency proceedings.
Courts will also have the benefit of agency expertise because they can come in as amici curiae. Clipper Exxpress v Rocky Mountain Mo-tor Tariff Bureau, Inc ' 67 provides an excellent example. In Clipper, the Interstate Commerce Commission fied an amicus curiae brief to inform the court of its position regarding its tariff amendments application process. ' ' It informed the court that it lacked the resources to check the information contained in the applications and offered its opinion on the application.'o Thus, the fact-specific standard leads to a world where budget-strapped, aggrieved agencies can turn to the courts for relief from fraudulent practices without courts being deprived of agencies' expertise on those matters.
Checking agency action.
Unlike the now-defunct ICC, many agencies have procedures and resources to audit information given them by companies applying for licenses, permits, amendments and so forth.' 70 Some agencies even impose penalties for submitting bad information. 7 ' Even under these conditions, however, courts act as a check on agency action.
Courts give agencies leeway in their determinations. Courts must allow an agency's reasonable interpretation of an ambiguous congressional mandate to stand."' Courts also sometimes grant agencies significant leeway in their conclusions of fact." This deference will vary according to the agency and congressional mandate.' 7 Agencies have greater expertise than the courts in those areas, so this general deference seems justified.
There must be boundaries to agency discretion. The APA allows pricious" standard." 5 Also, several statutes specifically allow for judicial review of agency determinations. 7 6 Given this structure, courts act as a check on agency abuse of discretion, possibly to keep agencies from acting narrow-mindedly." Even though courts lack agency expertise in certain areas, they understand antitrust law and fraud claims better than agencies do. 77 Courts frequently determine if an agency's decision is based on fraudulent evidence and have the power to overturn that decision. The involvement of an antitrust claim does not change that picture.'7 In fact, the inclusion of antitrust liability increases the penalty for fraud because of its treble damages provision. Agency regulations do not hold the exclusive means for punishing fraudulent information. Thus, the fact-specific standard remains intact even if an agency has its own ways to find and punish fraudulent information.
Finally, the fact-specific standard is superior to Kottle and Armstrong's respective approaches to determining whether an agency should be subject to the fraud exception. Neither case articulated a definitive standard and both allowed for broad ranges of judicial interpretation. In particular, the Ninth Circuit admitted that it had not "clearly resolv[ed] the scope" of the sham exception in administrative proceedings. 7 This unarticulated standard risks chilling legitimate free speech. While the Court has exercised caution and is willing to risk some falsehood to promote free debate, a clearer standard will encourage businesses to be more diligent in their statements without preventing them from talking at all. 81 175 See 5 USC § 706(2)(A) (1994 Overall, this standard gives courts significantly more guidance in determining whether or not an administrative process is political or adjudicatory. It also protects First Amendment concerns by allowing debate in the political arena while giving the Sherman Act its full strength by regulating fraudulent business activity.
CONCLUSION
Let us return to the hypothetical posed at the beginning of this Comment. Stephenson and Cushing have intentionally blocked Flanigan from a legitimate opportunity to participate in a market by thwarting an administrative process designed to promote fair competition. This Comment has shown that the right to petition does not extend to the lengths that many defendant companies, such as Stephenson and Cushing, assert. Since the Noerr-Pennington doctrine rests on the right to petition, it should not be allowed to go further than the right itself. Two important goals are achieved by establishing a wellreasoned fraud standard based on existing precedent and properly tailoring antitrust laws to apply to adjudicatory processes achieves two important goals. First, administrative agencies will receive better information from parties. Second, agencies will render more accurate decisions. The fraud exception helps promote the purposes of the antitrust laws by ensuring that competition takes place on fair ground. Under this standard, Flanigan should have a fair chance of receiving approval for its drug based on the merits, rather than being frustrated by the misrepresentations of its competitors.
